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Este trabalho discute as perspectivas da regulação econômica no Brasil. Para tanto, 
primeiramente apresenta-se a evolução histórica da regulação no país, discutindo as principais 
questões relacionadas às agências reguladoras federais. Em segundo lugar, os marcos 
regulatórios de cinco diferentes setores (telecomunicações, eletricidade, saneamento básico, 
petróleo e gás natural) são analisados. Em terceiro lugar, a questão do financiamento de 
investimentos em infra-estrutura é tratada, enfatizando o papel das parcerias público-privadas 
(PPPs). Uma seção final contem um possível agenda para a regulação no Brasil. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper assesses the Brazilian regulatory framework and discusses the prospects for 
regulation in Brazil. First, a historical perspective on Brazilian economic regulation is 
provided, addressing the major issues concerning the Brazilian regulatory agencies. Second, a 
discussion of the regulatory framework in five sectors (telecommunications, electricity, water 
and sanitation, petroleum and natural gas) is presented. Third, the financing problems with 
special emphasis to public-private partnerships (PPPs) are addressed and a final section 
contains a possible agenda for regulatory policy in Brazil. 
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1 1    I In nt tr ro od du uc ct ti io on n   
The objective of this paper is to assess the Brazilian regulatory framework and discuss 
the prospects for regulation in Brazil. It is impossible to overstate the importance of adequate 
regulation for development. GDP and productivity growth are quite sensitive to investment in 
infra-structure. The latter, in turn, depends on a good regulatory framework. 
This study is divided into five sections. Section 2 provides a historical perspective on 
Brazilian economic regulation. Section 3 contains the major issues concerning the Brazilian 
regulatory agencies. 
Section 4 assesses the situation of the regulatory framework for five sectors: 
telecommunications, electricity, water and sanitation, petroleum and natural gas. Section 5 
discusses financing problems with special emphasis to public-private partnerships (PPPs). A 
final section contains a possible agenda for regulatory policy in Brazil. 
2 2    B Br ra az zi il li ia an n   R Re eg gu ul la at ti io on n   i in n   H Hi is st to or ri ic ca al l   P Pe er rs sp pe ec ct ti iv ve e   
 
The institutional aspects of the Brazilian economy during the eighties date back to the 
process of industrialization of the country since the beginning of the century and more clearly 
after the thirties. Under the so-called import substitution model, the State built up a productive 
structure, mainly involving infra-structure and intermediate goods and services, in order to 
induce industrialization. In addition to the prominent presence of the State, this model was also 
characterized by a closed economy producing mainly for the domestic market. 
The increasing importance of the State as a regulator relative to its presence in the 
production of good and services is associated with three factors. First, the previous phase of 
privatization attracted private, national and foreign capital interested in investments in 
segments controlled by the State. Second, the State mechanisms of intervention had been  
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depleted due to the fiscal crisis and increasing distortion provoked by the usual mechanisms of 
intervention such as subsidies, quotas and price controls. Third, the technological development 
in segments previously characterized by natural monopoly extended the possibilities of the 
introduction of competition in those segments.  
As occurred in other countries, such elements led to privatization programs in Brazil 
and, as a consequence, to the necessity of regulation in segments which were under the control 
of State monopolies. The Brazilian program surpassed the processes of privatization in other 
developing countries. It was, however, a partial process since important segments of 
petroleum, sanitation and banks, among others, remained in the hands of the State. 
The forms and extent of privatization in Brazil has varied sharply across sectors.   
Telecommunications and railroads have been privatized.  Partial privatization has occurred in 
electricity. More flexible entry permission was given to the private sector without the 
privatization of the state-owned company in petroleum. Concessions to private operators were 
provided to private operators and entry conditions were reduced to new competitors in civil 
aviation. 
The first phase of the privatization process benefited from capital account 
liberalization.
1 Federal Law No. 8031/90
2 enacted the Privatization Program, which began the 
process of reducing direct state intervention in the Brazilian economy. Its first phase covered 
the 1991-1994 period and focused on privatizing industrial-sector enterprises such as steel, 
petrochemicals and fertilizers that did not require the introduction of a specific regulatory 
framework. Receipts from privatization totaled US$ 8.6 billion in this period. 
The second privatization phase (1995-1998) comprised the sale of state-owned 
companies most directly active in infrastructure sectors such as telecommunications, electricity 
and railroads. In all, the program represented receipts of US$ 86.9 billion of which US$ 70.3 
                                                 
1 According to Bauman (1999), one result of capital account liberalization was that inflows of foreign 
portfolio investments rose from US$ 800 million in 1992 to US$ 7 billion in 1993. 
2 Published April 12, 1990.  
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billion corresponded to actual revenue from sales. Chart 1 summarizes the sectors that 
participated in both privatization phases in Brazil and indicates the degree of privatization 
(measured as private participation in production) that was observed. 
 
Chart 1: Degree of Privatization in Brazilian Sectors 
High Medium Low 
Petrochemical Electricity  Financial  Services 
Fertilizers Natural  Gas Petroleum 
Steel   Sanitation 
Telecommunications    
 
  In the second phase of the privatization program, given the nature of the sectors 
involved, specific regulatory frameworks were required. Brazil already had some government 
agencies with regulatory powers
3, but they did not have the same characteristics as the 
regulatory agencies created in the second half of the nineties, as part of the process of 
transforming the role of the State in the economic sphere. 
The new institutional environment, replacing the closed economy and its direct 
intervention by the open economy along with regulation, was related to private sector pressure 
to protect investments. Since investments involve long-term contractual commitments, the 
independence or autonomy of regulatory agencies provide greater certainty, making  it less 
vulnerable to any intervention by the Executive in the regulated sector. 
Indeed, the institutional environment in Brazil was significantly altered during the 
nineties with less direct intervention in economic activity and the state taking on more of a 
regulatory role. The creation of regulatory agencies was one of the key features of this process 
of institutional change. Their format is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 
                                                 
3 Such as the Central Bank (BACEN) - created by Law No. 4595, of December 31, 1964, or the 
Superintendence of Private Insurance  (SUSEP) - created by Law No. 73, of November 21, 1966 - or the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) - created by Law No. 6385 of December 7, 1976.  
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3 3    T Th he e   B Br ra az zi il li ia an n   R Re eg gu ul la at to or ry y   A Ag ge en nc ci ie es s   
The institutional format of the regulatory agencies is new in Brazil. Chart 2 shows, in 
chronological order, a subset of regulatory agencies created in Brazil in the second half of the 
nineties as part of the changes associated with the privatization of  infra-structure. 
Chart 2: Brazil - Regulatory Agencies 
AGENCY LAW  ACTIVITY  MINISTRY 
ANEEL – Agência 
Nacional de 
Energia Elétrica 
Law No. 9427, 
1996 
Regulation and inspection of 
production, transmission, 








Law No. 9472, 
1997 
Regulation and inspection of 
telecommunications  Communications 
ANP – Agência 
Nacional do 
Petróleo 
Law No. 9478, 
1997 
Regulation and inspection of 







Law No. 9782, 
1999 
Sanitary control of the production 
and the commercialization of 
products and services, as well as the 
control of ports, airports and 
borders 
Health 
ANS – Agência 
Nacional de Saúde 
Suplementar 
Law No. 9961, 
2000 
Regulation and inspection of the 
activities that guarantee health 
supplemental assistance 
Health 
ANA – Agência 
Nacional das Águas 
Law No. 9984, 
2000 
Enforcement of the National Policy 
on Water Resources.  Enviroment 




Law No. 10233, 
2001. 




Law No. 10233, 
2001. 
Enforcement of the Conselho 
Nacional de Integração de Políticas 
de Transportes’ politicies and 
regulation and inspection of 
transports’ services 
Transport 
Source: laws cited above.  
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        The following three subsections discuss the characteristics of the regulatory 
agencies, how the private sector evaluates two of the most important agencies (in electricity 
and telecommunications) and how independent the Brazilian agencies are in comparison with a 
sample of agencies in the world. 
 
3.1 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BRAZILIAN REGULATORY 
AGENCIES 
 
The regulatory agencies replaced the direct administration in a number of functions. 
Part of the decision power of the sectoral ministries was transferred to them. This requires 
institutional building. For the new system to work well a number of prerequisites have to be 
met: 
i)  precise definition of the jurisdiction of each agency; 
ii)  coordination among the different agencies; 
iii)  strong technical expertise; and  
iv)  independence from the central administration and from any private interest. 
The lack of precise definition of functions is a major problem in Brazil. There is a 
frequent overlapping of functions among different agencies. Take for instance the example of a 
merger between two companies in the distribution of natural gas. The electricity regulator, 
ANEEL, has jurisdiction because natural gas is an input for thermoelectricity; but the regulator 
of natural gas is ANP; however, the distribution of the product is under the responsibility of 
the subnational state which has a subnational regulator; finally, mergers are authorized by the 
competition authorities, which in the case of Brazil means three different bodies attached to 
two different ministries! 
Lack of coordination is another great problem. It is becoming frequent to have several 
issues relating shared infra-structure in electricity, telecomunnications and other sectors. There 
is not a solid legal basis for providing a rapid and efficient decision process. The problem is  
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even more serious in regard to the numerous antitrust questions which come up among 
regulated firms. It is far from clear which regulator has jurisdiction in many cases:  the sectoral 
regulator or the competition authority. 
The lack of adequately trained staff varies across sectors. The absence of a specific 
bureaucratic career for regulators within the Brazilian state remains as a serious pitfall. This 
fact explains the relatively high rate of turnover among public officials and consequent waste 
of public resources in training and loss of institutional memory. 
But among the desirable characteristics of the regulatory agencies, independence is the 
most important one.  Private investors need to know whether there is a regulator who will be 
impartial. The decision making autonomy of these agencies is vital for the adoption of 
technical decisions. The latter is key for the stability and quality of the regulation, which is 
essential for attracting investment.  
We can identify eight characteristics which are associated with agencies’ 
independence: 
i.  participation of Congress in the nomination of the directors of the agencies; 
ii.  technical background for directors required by law; 
iii.  long directors’ tenure; 
iv.  budget autonomy; 
v.  collective decision; 
vi.  quarantine after completion of term; 
vii.  appeal of decisions only to courts; 
viii.  transparency. 
The directors’ tenures vary from three to five years. In five of the agencies (ANVISA, 
ANS, ANTT, ANTAQ and ANA) a second term is possible as noted in Chart 3. This can affect 
the agency’s independence, since there might be an incentive for a director to avoid 
confrontation with the central administration in order to obtain another mandate.  
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OF A SECOND 
TERM  
ANEEL 
Proposed by the President 
and appointed by the 
President after Senate 
approval. 
4 years.  No. 
ANATEL 
Proposed by the President 
and appointed by the 
President after Senate 
approval. 
5 years.  No. 
ANP 
Proposed by the President 
and appointed by the 
President after Senate 
approval. 
4 years.  No. 
ANVISA 
Proposed by the President 
and appointed by the 
President after Senate 
approval.  
3 years.  One re-
appointment. 
ANS 
Proposed by the President 
and appointed by the 
President after Senate 
approval.  
3 years.  One re-
appointment. 
ANA 
Proposed by the President 
and appointed by the 
President after Senate 
approval. 
4 years.  One re-
appointment 
ANTT 
Proposed by the President 
and appointed by the 
President after Senate 
approval.  
4 years.  One re-
appointment. 
ANTAQ 
Proposed by the President 
and appointed by the 
President after Senate 
approval.  
4 years.  One re-
appointment. 
     Source: laws cited in Chart 2 
 
Even when regulatory agencies enjoy functional independence, ensured by the mandate 
granted for their directors, there must be financial independence - otherwise regulatory 
agencies will inevitably be dependent upon the will of the controller of the budget. In the  
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Brazilian case, although Congress may have some influence on the performance of the 
regulatory agencies through approval of the federal budget, the latter is strongly influenced by 
the Executive. Thus, the financial resources of the regulatory agencies must arise from the 
revenues with taxes for services related to the regulatory activity.  
Besides agency independence from political pressures, it is crucial to insulate the 
decision body from the regulated companies. Thus, the following characteristics of the 
agencies are important to prevent its capture by the private sector through lobbies and 
corruption: collective decision (Chart 4), quarantine (Chart 5), inexistence of administrative 
appeal within the Executive and maximum transparency in its activities.  (Chart 6). Charts 4, 5 
and 6 illustrate how such characteristics are present at least formally in the design of the 
Brazilian agencies. 
Chart 4: Management Structure of Agencies 
AGENCY BOARD DECISIONS 
ANEEL 
– Collegiate regime, board composed of a Director General and four 
Directors. 
– There is an Attorney General as part of the organizational structure. 
Majority. 
ANATEL 
– Collegiate regime, executive board consisting of a President and 4 
board members. 
– The organizational structure includes Consultative Council, an 
Attorney and an Ombudsman. 
Majority. 
ANP 
– Collegiate regime, board consisting of a Director General and four 
Directors. 
– There is an Attorney General as part of the organizational structure. 
Majority. 
ANVISA 
– Collegiate regime, board consisting of a President and 4 Directors. 
– The organizational structure comprises a Consultative Council 
(representatives from Federal authorities, States, the Federal District, 
Municipalities, producers, commerce, the scientific community and 
users), an Attorney General, an Auditor General, an Ombudsman and 
specialized units assigned different functions. 
Majority. 
ANS 
– Collegiate regime, board consisting of a President and 4 Directors. 
– The organizational structure comprises an Attorney General, an 
Auditor General, an Ombudsman and specialized units assigned 
different functions. 
– There is also the Supplementary Chamber of Health, which is a 
standing body of an advisory character. 
Majority. 
ANA  – Collegiate regime, board consisting of a President and 4 Directors.  Majority. 
ANTT 
– Collegiate regime, board consisting of a Director General and 4 
Directors. The organizational structure includes an Attorney, an 
Ombudsman and an Inspector General (whose duty is to supervise the 
Majority, 
Director General 
has casting vote.  
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functional activities of the agency and conduction of administrative 
and disciplinary proceedings). 
ANTAQ 
Collegiate regime, board consisting of a Director General and 2 
Directors 
The organizational structure includes an Attorney, an Ombudsman and 
an Inspector General (whose duty is to supervise the functional 




has casting vote. 
  Source: see text 
Chart 5: Quarantine Arrangements for the Agencies 
Agency Quarantine 
ANEEL 
12 months before direct or indirectly providing services to companies under 
regulation of or overseen by the agency, including controlled companies, affiliates or 
subsidiaries, under penalty of conducting administrative advocacy.  
During the impediment period, a former-director may continue to provide 
services to ANEEL or any other organ of the direct public federal administration with 
remuneration equivalent to that of the position previously held. 
ANATEL 
For 1 year after leaving a position, a former-board member may not represent 
any person or interest before the agency. 
ANP 
12 months before providing services to a company in the oil industry or 
distribution under penalty of committing administrative advocacy. 
– During impediment, any former-director not dismissed under the terms of 
Article 12 may continue to provide services to ANP or to any body of the Direct 
Administration, for remuneration equivalent to that of the director’s position held. 
ANVISA 
– For 1 year after leaving the position, a former-director is not allowed to 
represent any person or interest before the agency. 
ANS 
– For 1 year after leaving the position a former- director of ANS may not 
represent any person or interest before the agency or hold an interest, position or 
function in an organization subject to regulation by the agency. 
ANA  – There is no specific provision in this respect. 
ANTT  – For 1 year after leaving the position a former-director may not represent any  
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person or interest before the agency. 
ANTAQ 
For 1 year after leaving the position a former- director may not represent any 
person or interest before the agency 
  Source: see text 
 
Chart 6: Instruments for Transparency and Participation in Agencies 
AGENCY  ORGANIZED PARTICIPATION 
OF SOCIETY  TRANSPARENCY / ACCOUNTABILITY  
ANEEL 
– Any decision making process that 
may affect the rights of the economic 
agents in the electricity sector or those 
of consumers, arising from 
administrative action of the Agency or 
from draft legislation proposed by 
ANEEL, will be preceded by a public 
hearing. 
– Meetings of the ANEEL board for the 
purpose of settling disputes among economic 
agents of the electricity sector or between the 
latter and consumers, or to rule on infractions 
committed against the law or regulations, may 
be held in public, at the board's discretion, and 
be electronically recorded, with the interested 
parties having the right to obtaining 
transcriptions. 
– ANEEL management will be hired through a 
management contract negotiated and entered 
into between the Management and the 
Executive Power within ninety days of the 
appointment of the Director General, and a 
copy of the instrument must be forwarded for 
registration at the Court of Accounts, where it 
will be used as reference material for 
operational auditing. 
ANATEL 
– The Agency has the competence to 
implement, within its sphere of 
attributions, the nation's 
telecommunications policy, issue rules 
on the licensing, provision and usage of 
telecommunications services under the 
public regime, with prior public 
consultation for proposals to be 
submitted to the President. 
– Deliberative board sessions for settling 
disputes between economic agents, or between 
the latter and consumers and users of 
telecommunications goods and services, will be 
held in public; sessions may be electronically 
recorded and interested parties have the right to 
obtain transcriptions. 
ANP 
– Initiatives concerning draft legislation 
or alterations of administrative rules 
that may affect economic agents' rights 
or those of consumers and users of oil 
industry goods and services will be 
preceded by a public hearing 
summoned and directed by ANP. 
– The internal regulation of ANP will 
rule on the procedures to be adopted to 
settle conflicts between economic 
– Deliberative sessions of the ANP board held 
for the purpose of settling disputes between 
economic agents and between the latter and 
consumers and users of oil industry goods and 
services will be held in public.  
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agents and between the latter and users 
or consumers, with the emphasis on 
conciliation and arbitration. 
ANVISA 
 
– Existence of an Consultative Council 
consisting of representatives of federal 
institutions, states, the Federal District, 
municipalities, producers, commerce, 
the scientific community and users. 
– Management contract negotiated between its 
President and the Minister of Health, after prior 
consultation with the Ministers of Finance and 
Planning within a minimum (sic) of 120 days 
after the appointment of the President
4. 
ANS 
– Through the  Supplementary Health 
Chamber 
– The board has the function of drafting and 
publishing periodic reports on its activities. 
Forward ANS accounting statements to the 
competent organs. 
– The management of ANS is governed by a 
management contract negotiated between its 
President and the Minister of Health and 
approved by the Council for Supplementary 
Health, which sets parameters for the internal 
administration of ANS and indicators to 




---  – will publicize requests for the right to use 
water resources in the federal domain, as well 
as administrative actions resulting from the 
these requests, through publication in the 
official press and in at least one newspaper 
widely circulated in the corresponding region. 
– The board has the competence to: draw up 
and publish reports on the activities of the 
agency; (ii) forward the agency's accounting 
statements to the competent bodies. 
ANTT 
– Draft legislation initiatives, 
alterations of administrative rules and 
the board's decisions when settling 
disputes that affect the rights of 
economic agents or users of transport 
services will be preceded by a public 
hearing. 
– Any interested party is entitled to 
submit petition or appeal against 
actions of the agency, within 30 days of 
their becoming official.  
– Decisions taken by the agency's board will be 
recorded in publicly available minutes together 
with relevant documents whenever publicity 
does not endanger the security of the Country or 
violate confidentiality.  
                                                 
4 Under the legislation that set up ANVISA, the management contract is the instrument for evaluating the 
administrative performance of the agency, deciding parameters for the organizations internal 
administration, and indicators for periodically and objectively assessing and quantifying its performance. 
5Under the legislation that set up ANS, the management contract will set parameters for the internal 
administration of the agency, as well as indicators for objectively evaluating its administrative work and 
level of performance.  
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ANTAQ 
– Draft legislation initiatives, 
alterations of administrative rules and 
the board's decisions when settling 
disputes that affect the rights of 
economic agents or users of transport 
services will be preceded by a public 
hearing. 
– Any interested party will be entitled 
to submit a petition or appeal actions of 
the agency within 30 days of their 
becoming official.  
– Decisions taken by the agency's board will be 
recorded in publicly available minutes together 
with relevant documents whenever publicity 
does not endanger the security of the Country or 
violate confidentiality.  
  Source: see text 
 
3.2 HOW THE BRAZILIAN AGENCIES ARE SEEN BY THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
 
The information of Subsection 3.1 corresponds to legal definitions. In addition, it is 
useful to see a survey conducted by the American Chamber of Commerce in São Paulo in 
order to evaluate the performance of ANATEL and ANEEL. The results are based on a 
questionnaire, answered by regulated firms, consulting companies, associations related to the 
regulated sector, financial institutions and consumers. Chart 7 and Chart 8 present the answers 











                                                 
6 The surveys are available at www.amcham.com.br  
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Chart 7: Evaluation of ANATEL 
   2003  2004  2005 




made by public 
consults? 
15,8%  84,2%  10,0%  90,0%  21,2%  78,8% 
Does ANATEL act 
in a preventive form 
in order to promote 
and guarantee 
competition in the 
sector?  
86,3%  23,7%  71,0%  29,0%  77,3%  22,7% 
Does ANATEL 
present a technically 
prepared 
personnel?* 
60,5%  39,5%  34,0%  66,0%  35,4%  64,6% 
Does ANATEL act 
in coordination with 
different agencies, 
such as ANP, 
ANEEL and Cade? 
47,4%  52,6%  39,0%  61,0%  54,7%  45,3% 
Is there a duplicity 
of functions between 
ANATEL and the 
Ministry of 
Communications? 
71,1%  29,0%  73,0%  27,0%  39,7%  60,3% 
Source: see text. 
In 2005, this question was divided into financial and technical aspects. The results above refer 
to the technical expertise of the agency’s personnel. 
 
Chart 8: Evaluation of ANEEL 
   2003  2004  2005 
















a high level 
of 
competition? 
83,45%  16,55%  33,33%  66,67%  25,00%  75,00%  
 
 















38,73%  61,26%  38,89%  61,11%  25,90%  74,10% 





38,73%  61,26%  22,22%  77,78%  11,10%  88,90% 












How do you 












--  --  16,67%  83,33%  0,00%  100,00% 
Source: see text. 
The survey indicates that both agencies present a reasonable level of technical expertise 
and transparency. However, it is evaluated that ANATEL has not been capable of promoting 
competition in the telecommunication’s sector. Moreover, there does not seem to prevail a 
precise definition of ANATEL’s jurisdiction, since the survey points to the existence of 
duplicity of functions between the agency and the Ministry of Communications. 
In regard to ANEEL, the agency is perceived as being able to promote competition. 
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3.3 BRAZILIAN REGULATORY AGENCIES IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
The previous subsection discussed agents’ perception about the regulatory agencies. We 
now try to provide a less subjective piece of evidence. From the eight characteristics associated 
with independence and from the previous description of the Brazilian agencies we can provide 
a general idea, at least from the formal point of view.  
In order to do that we apply an independence indicator (II) to a sample of International 
Competition Network – ICN countries. The questionnaire was sent to the 86 ICN member 
countries, obtaining answers from 29 countries (33% of the population).  Further details of 
how the index was constructed can be found in Appendix I and in Oliveira, Machado, Novaes 
and Cardoso (2005). 
In order to capture the independence characteristics the following measuring criterion 
was used: value 1 was ascribed for each of the eight elements of independence. The lack of an 
institutional characteristic that favors independence will be captured by the value zero. For 
questions with more than one item the result represents the average of values for each item. 
Lastly, the partial points are added and II is obtained as shown in Equation 1. 







            ( 1 )  
Where i represents each individual question, so that ai Є [0; 1] represents the score 
obtained; and 0 ≤ II ≤ 8. The closer the score is to eight, the higher the independence indicator 
is. Note that this indicator captures only formal independence. The extent to which the 
regulatory authority is independent in practice is not directly reflected in II. 
Note also that the respondents are competition authorities. Although the answers may 
not be considered official and safe from errors, the questions are objective and do not allow 
significant deviation. In any event, if there is some leeway for different interpretations of a  
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particular question, competition authorities are presumably more capable of providing an 
impartial and external view.   
The replies of a total of 117 regulatory agencies of various countries were analyzed. 
Twenty-eight pertain to the telecommunications sector, 27 to the electricity sector, 25 to the 
fuel sector, 20 to the transportation sector and 17 to other sectors. One perceives a high 
concentration of agencies in four sectors, which account for 85.47% of the questionnaires 
received. 
It is rather surprising that the II results do not vary in line with the development levels. 
One would initially think that developed countries would present a higher II than developing 
nations.  
Chart 9 shows the ranking of countries, obtained from the arithmetic average of the 
regulatory agencies of the respondent countries. It is noteworthy that the averages of II 
obtained by developed countries. This suggests that there is not a simple relation between the 
level of development and the level of independence.  
The Brazilian agencies are endowed with a series of formal instruments to assure its 
independence. Thus, Brazilian agencies present a relatively high level (sixth place) of 
independence within a ranking of formal independence based on a survey of 117 agencies of 
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Chart 9: Independence index (II) by country 
Country 
II 
average  Number of agencies 
Serbia  7.75  1 
France  7.55  3 
Latvia  7.41  4 
Italy  7.16  3 
Portugal  6.75  4 
Brazil  6.66  4 
Turkey  6.50  4 
Bulgaria  6.44  3 
Cyprus  5.54  2 
Hungary  5.44  4 
Germany  5.17  4 
Estonia  5.12  5 
Lithuania  5.07  5 
United States*  4.94  4 
Spain  4.83  3 
Sample 4.60 117 
Argentina  4.54  7 
Australia  4.42  5 
Zambia  4.38  5 
Pakistan  4.03  5 
Mexico  4.02  5 
Netherlands  3.42  4 
Tunisia  3.25  1 
Uzbekistan  3.19  7 
Sweden  3.17  4 
Ireland  3.17  4 
Japan  2.83  4 
Chile  2.53  5 
Poland  1.88  4 
Taiwan  1.75  4 
* The U.S. respondents indicated that questions 4.1 and 4.2 
were not applicable. In this case, we assumed those to be 0. 
Source: The authors 
 
With the purpose of assessing the existence of a relationship between the level of 
independence and certain attributes of the regulatory agencies. Equations (2) and (3) show the 
tested models: 
Model 01:  
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 II=  0 β + 1 β .HDI+ 2 β .S_Electr+ 3 β .S_Telecom+ 4 β .S_Gas+ 5 β .F_Franc       (2) 
Model 02: 
 II=  0 β + 1 β .AGE+ 2 β .HDI+ 3 β .S_Electr+ 4 β .S_Telecom+ 5 β .S_gas+ 6 β .F_Franc  (3) 
Where, 
AGE:  the legal age of each regulatory agency
7; 
HDI:  human development index of the country of the regulatory agency;
8 
S_Electr, S_Telecom, S_gas: Vectors of dummies variables that identifies the 
regulated sector; 
F_franc: Vector of dummy variables that identifies the legal family of the 
country.
9 
The following hypotheses were tested: 
-  If the age of the agencies is associated with the independence attributes; 
-  If countries with lower degree of development delegate more power to 
independent agencies in order to reduce a possible credibility deficit; 
-  If the regulated sector has a high explanatory  power;  and 
-  If legal tradition of the country matters. 
The estimation for the model proposed in Equation 2 used the series in the logarithmic 
form, obtained through a monotonic transformation. Additionally, the observations of agencies 
with up to one year of age were eliminated. In the last decade a certain format for the 
regulatory agencies was established that follows a trend of more independence of the 
regulatory bodies. 
                                                 
7 The information was obtained directly from the Internet pages of each regulatory agency. 
8 The data was gathered from the World Bank for year 2004. 
9 According to Djankov et al (2003) the legal families of the countries are German, English, French, 
Scandinavian and Socialist.  
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The regression results obtained by OLS are showed in Appendix II. The dummy 
variables for the regulated sector and legal families appear to be significantly relevant (Chart 
14). Note that the variable AGE, included in Model 2, is not significant.  
Although preliminary, the results obtained suggest a few points. First, the existence of 
negative relation between the II and the AGE of the regulatory agency shows that in the course 
of time the independence attribute do not become a characteristic that is present in the legal 
format of the regulatory agencies. 
Second, the existence of negative relationship between the HDI and the II could 
validate the credibility hypothesis. Developing countries lack credibility in their institutions. 
Therefore their governments resort to a higher and not lower degree of delegation to the 
regulatory agencies. 
The sector and the legal tradition seem to have an influence at least in terms of formal 
independence which is the type of independence we are being able to capture at the moment. 
The existence of independent regulators is crucial for attracting investment. However, we note 
that there is not a uniform way to conceive and measure independence. Moreover, we have not 
yet been able to capture real independence.  
Our preliminary evidence suggests that there is not a positive association between 
development levels and independence of regulatory agencies. This could indicate that the 
“credibility hypothesis” is valid. This hypothesis states that developing countries lack 
credibility in their institutions and therefore their governments resort to a higher and not lower 
degree of delegation to the regulatory agencies.  
The above discussion points to the importance of formal mechanisms to guarantee 
agency independence. However, it is also necessary to have indications of real independence. 
This requires an effort to go beyond the mere verification of what the law states. A possible 
measure is what we call the index of potential political influence based on the commissioners’ 
background.   
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A simple form is to distinguish between a “technical background” from a “political 
background”. We analyzed a sample of regulators’ CVs from ANATEL, ANEEL, ANP, 
ANVISA, ANS, ANA, ANTAQ and ANTT. If the regulator showed any technical or academic 
experience related to the specific sector, we consider his or her background to be technical. It 
was considered a “political background” otherwise. Chart 10 suggests that there has been an 
increase in the percentage of regulators with political background in 2005 compared to 2002. 
 
Chart 10: Degree of Potential Political Influence in the Regulatory Agencies 
Year 2002 2005 
Number of directors  
 
















Source: own elaboration. See text for the methodology 
In sum, Brazilian regulatory agencies represented an important institutional change. 
However, several improvements are still necessary: 
-  more coordination among the different sectoral agencies and betweem 
them and the competition authorities; 
-  in practice the mechanisms of financial independence do not work and 
agencies do not have stable and adequate human and material resources; 
-  formal independence seems to be high by international standards, but there 
is much to be done in terms of real independence; 
-  the degree of potential political interference seems to be high and 
increasing.   
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4 4    R Re eg gu ul la at to or ry y   F Fr ra am me ew wo or rk k   i in n   S Se el le ec ct te ed d   S Se ec ct to or rs s   
A single general regulatory framework is not enough. The construction of a sectoral 
regulatory framework constitutes a sine qua non condition to stimulate  investment. Such   
framework contains  the relevant rules  to  participate in each segment.  The next paragraphs 
describe the current issues in  telecommunications, electricity, sanitation, petroleum and 
natural gas sectors. 
These five  sectors have been chosen in a rather arbitrary way. However, they are 
obviously important in terms of investment. They also illustrate the diversity of the regulatory 
situation of the Brazilian infra-structure as Chart 11 shows. 
Chart 11: State Intervention and Legal Uncertainty in Selected Sectors 
Degree of State Intervention 
Sector 
Generation  Transmision/Processing/




Electricity XX  XX  X  -  XX 
Sanitation XXX  XXX  XXX  -  XXX 
Petroleum  XXX  XXX  XX X XX 
Natural Gas  XX  XXX  XX  XX  XXX 
* X – Low, XX – Medium, XXX – High. 
  
Telecommunications 
Telecommunications is a success case in terms of privatization and regulation in Brazil 
in comparison with the other sectors. l. The access of the Brazilian population to fixed and 
mobile phones has shown a strong growth in the previous years. Since ANATEL´s creation in 
1997, the number of fixed telephone accesses more than doubled while the number of mobile 
phones in operation grew by more than 1500%. 
Part of the success of the telecommunications sector regulation in Brazil can be 
explained by the fact that, differently from what occurred  in the electricity and sanitation 
sectors,  privatization was preceded by the establishment of a regulatory framework. Thus, the  
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General Law of Telecommunications and the creation of ANATEL in 1997 allowed and 
stimulated private investments after the privatization of the Telebrás system in 1998.  
Besides, three aspects of the regulation in the sector contributed to its relative success. 
Firstly, the establishment (prior to the privatization) of expansion and quality goals. Secondly, 
the possibility of competition, with the creation of mirror-companies, competitors of the 
privatized regional holdings.  Lastly, the use of mechanisms (such as price caps) of tariff 
correction that stimulates the productivity of the regulated firms.  
However, two aspects raise concerns about regulation in telecommunications in Brazil. 
First, technological advance and the development of the market have made the current 
regulatory framework obsolete. The increasing substitution of fixed telephones by mobile 
phones and the creation of the so-called third-generation telecommunications, linking voice, 
video and data transmission in one piece, for example, imposed new challenges to the creation 
of a regulatory framework. 
Regulation must be ruled by technological neutrality, allowing the market to select the 
appropriate technology. The rules of the game must adapt to the technological changes: 
regulation must not be divided into industries, but into services. 
Second, in the last three years there have been a series of interventions by the Judiciary 
in the sector, altering the tariff correction index (in 2003) and forbidding the exercise of two-
part tariffs in the fixed telephony and the expiration of credits in mobile “pre-paid” telephones. 
In addition, it should be noted that two of the Communication Ministers have publicly 
manifested their opposition to the previously established contractual rules. Regardless of the 
merit of the question, these actions do represent breaches in contracts between ANATEL and 
the regulated companies, and this instability contributes negatively to investment in the sector. 
 Electricity 
Privatization and regulation in electricity have failed in many aspects. The current 
regulation was established in the biennium of 1997-98, with the creation of ANEEL and the  
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Wholesale Energy Market (MAE). The model divided the vertically integrated structure of the 
sector, attracting private ownership to the segment where there is the possibility of competition 
(energy generation). A price regulation scheme was established in segments characterized as 
natural monopolies (transmission and distribution), aiming at establishing incentives for 
moderate tariffs as well as for investment. 
The supply crisis that culminated with the electrical energy rationing in 2001 reflects 
the failure of the policy adopted in the sector. However, such failure cannot be attributed only 
to the privatization process. By the time of the energy crisis, only 20% of the generation was 
privatized. Part of the problem is that the planned privatization process was not actually 
implemented. The lack of definition regarding crucial variables such as the price of natural gas 
prevented investment in thermoelectricity from increasing. 
Despite the fact that the lack of energy supply was solved after the energy rationing 
period, the privatization process stopped and the lack of regulation to promote investments 
remain until today, mainly because of the instability associated with the new model for the 
electricity sector. 
The new paradigm established by the current government assumes that a competitive 
model would be incapable to guarantee moderate tariffs and service continuity. Thus, the 
government transferred the majority of the energy production decisions to a state agency 
(Empresa de Pesquisa Energética), and established that the contract of forecasted energy is to 
be done through a minimum price auction bid.  
The new model transfers the power from ANEEL to the Ministry of Mines and Energy. 
Thus, it centralizes the decisions in the Executive Power and does not create the stability of 
rules necessary to stimulate investment. 
 Rodrigues and Schechtman (2005) point out that in a scenario where the Brazilian 
GDP grows at a 4% annual rate, there is the possibility of a new energy rationing in 2009 or 
2010, unless new investments are immediately initiated. Moreover, TCI (2003) estimates that 
the current investment gap in the sector is R$ 11 billion per year, assuming a 3.4% annual  
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growth over the next decade; it is estimated that the necessary average annual investments in 
the electricity sector is  R$ 20.1 billion and  only R$ 9 billion can  be financed by public 
sources and multilateral agencies.  
Sanitation 
The major institutional problem of of  sanitation  is the absence of a regulatory 
framework. Since the 1988 Constitution, four projects of sector regulation were sent to 
Congress, and none of them have been approved until now
10. However, the matter is urgent. 
According to Census data, less than half the Brazilian urban population has access to 
appropriate sewage systems.  
According to Turolla and Ohira (2005), the lack of consensus regarding the allocation 
of conceding power between states and municipalities constitutes the main political drawback 
for the approval of old projects. 
The current structure of the sector is similar to the one established by the Planasa 
(National Sanitation Plan) in 1971. Nowadays, however, the public companies are not able to 
attend the sector investment needs. Motta (2005) points out that public companies have deficits 
or are dependent on subsidies and transfers from the State, being unable to promote the 
necessary investments in the sector, estimated in 0.5% of GDP.  
The lack of clear rules also avoids privatization. Only 4% of the country is operated by 
the private sector, a figure that contrasts with neighboring countries such as Argentina, where 
more than half of the municipalities make use of private sanitation services. 
The  project of regulation recently sent by the federal government to Congress shows 
improvement by defining the allocation of conceding power and seeking transparency in the 
taxes and cross-subsidy structures in the sector. However, there are still great deficiencies in 
the project. Firstly, there are no instruments to encourage the efficiency of the regulated firms. 
                                                 
10 PLC 199/91, PLS 266/96, PL 4147/01, PL 5296/05  
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In this sense, Motta and Moreira (2004) point out large efficiency variations among sanitation 
companies, which would indicate the lack of appropriate incentives in certain locations. 
Moreover, the study shows that the efficiency gains are not passed on to the tariffs. 
Secondly, there are still breaches to hire public companies without the use of 
competitive bids. This last point makes it possible to use political criteria when hiring 
companies and inhibits private participation and investment. 
Petroleum: 
For over 40 years, the petroleum and natural gas sectors were dominated by Petrobras, 
holder of the legal monopoly over the activities of exploration, refining and transportation of 
petroleum derivatives. As the public monopoly was made more flexible in 1995, it became 
necessary to establish rules that would allow the private participation in the sector, which 
originated the “Petroleum Law” and the ANP (National Petroleum Agency) in 1997. 
However, Petrobrás practically kept its monopoly over the refining and transportation 
segments, being responsible for 95% of the petroleum derivatives production and controlling 
90% of the draining capacity of these products. Thus, ANP became mostly responsible for 
controlling entry in the exploration sector, via auctions, and resale inspection (gas stations). 
Moreover, even with the end of the state control over petroleum derivative prices in 
2002, there is still a certain amount of government influence over Petrobrás prices. Gasoline 
prices in the Brazilian refineries are not in line with the international price at the moment, even 
with the recent rise in prices. 
 Petrobras investments made possible an almost self-sufficiency in petroleum, which 
contrasts with the situation at the end of the seventies, when 85% of the petroleum consumed 
in Brazil was imported. However, it is worth noting that self-sufficiency is associated with the 
modest growth of the economy, and consequently with the demand for fuel over the last years. 
Thus, it is possible that in the long run, imports and private exploration become important to 
guarantee the supply of the product.   
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In this sense, the main challenge of the sector is to attract private investments in the 
exploitation and production sectors and in the import infrastructure Indeed, imports could limit 
somewhat Petrobras’ market power. For this, it will be necessary to consider two points. First, 
give guarantee of access to the transportation and distribution networks from Petrobrás, 
making it clear that the public company cannot discriminate in its own favor.  
Second, it will be important to assure clear rules for pricing policy, eliminating the 
political interference in pricing decisions. Prices below the international level make it 
impossible to achieve a positive return of the investments in the production and import 
segments, removing private participation in the sector.  
Natural Gas 
Despite the fact that natural gas responds for only 3% of the Brazilian energy matrix, 
the discovery of the Santos Basin reserves, which tripled the amount of reserves known in 
Brazil, has increased the importance of this energy source. Natural gas is also relevant as an 
input for the electric sector, given that the capacity of the natural gas thermo-electrical plants 
generation corresponds to almost 10% of the national capacity. 
The existence of recently discovered reserves increases the importance of appropriate 
regulation, capable of allowing investments in exploration. However, as happens with the 
petroleum derivatives, the current regulation does not define clear rules over the access to the 
gas transportation and distribution structures. This matter is even more complex regarding 
natural gas, as both the transportation and distribution segments constitute natural monopolies. 
 Rodrigues and Campos Filho (2004) point out the importance of the access guarantee, 
by third parties, to the transportation and distribution networks. This is crucial to avoid abuse 
of market power and to guarantee stability for exploitation investments. However, the authors 
point out that this does not occur in practice, by mentioning that the market access to the 
Brazil-Bolivia pipelines dealt with long and conflicting negotiations.  
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Moreover, the natural gas is treated on the Brazilian legislation as a petroleum 
derivative, subject to the determinations of the Petroleum Law. This regulatory framework 
ignores specific natural gas market characteristics and is not capable of setting clear rules to 
the sector relations. This matter is aggravated by the fact that the natural gas distribution is 
subject to the state regulation, generating the need for a clear setting up of jurisdictions and 
rules for the interaction between state regulatory agencies and ANP, responsible for the 
regulation of exploitation and transportation links. 
Therefore, as in the case of sanitation, it is necessary to create a specific regulatory 
framework for the natural gas sector. There is already a Law Project in this respect, which 
correctly establishes rules for competitive bids to the concession of transportation services and 
strengthens the role of ANP (together with another agency yet to be created) in order to 
establish rules, tariffs and avoid discrimination in the access of pipelines.  
 
The above analysis suggests that there is a long way to complete the regulatory reform 
which began in the nineties. The case of relative success of the telecommunications sectors is 
in clear contrast with other sectors where a regulatory framework is lacking, such as the 
natural gas or sanitation. Competition problems are also serious when state-owned firms have 
kept high market power as in the case of  petroleum. 
5 5    T Th he e   P Pr ro ob bl le em m   o of f   F Fi in na an nc ci in ng g   B Br ra az zi il li ia an n   I In nf fr ra a- -s st tr ru uc ct tu ur re e   
Given the fiscal constraints of the Brazilian state, it is urgent to stimulate a crowding in 
of private investment.  As the international experience suggests, the public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) constitute a useful instrument to spur private investments in infra-structure. The 
Executive has negotiated in Congress, in December 2004, the approval of a law which makes 
the implementation of projects by public and private sector partnerships possible.   
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 After three months of postponements, the Partnership Guarantor Fund (for insolvency 
cases) was created and its administrator defined, as well as the assets (stockholdings) which 
will compose it. Despite all the initiatives taken in the federal level  in relation to the PPPs, it 
seems very unlikely that the project contracts elected as priorities by the Executive will be 
undertaken  before 2007.  
There are five projects considered  priorities by the government: (1) the North-South 
Railway construction; (2) the recovery of the BR-116 Highway, from Rio de Janeiro to Feira 
de Santana (Bahia); (3) the São Paulo Railway Beltway; (4) the Railway stretch between 
Guarapuava and Ipiranga, in Paraná; and (5) the Rio de Janeiro city beltway. However, 
analysts remain skeptical about the possibility of implementing such projects before 2007.   
The PPPs’ mechanism, must not be seen as a panacea. It is a useful institutional format 
but it requires certain pre-conditions. First, it is important that the risk reduction to the private 
sector is not obtained by the increase in the fiscal risk.  Second, the PPP is an “umbrella” 
contract, which does not substitute the sector rules, but complements it. The partnership will 
only work if, besides the general terms of the PPP, clear rules are defined and are appropriate 
to each infrastructure segment. 
6 6    P Pr ro os sp pe ec ct ts s   f fo or r   t th he e   F Fu ut tu ur re e   
Regulatory reform in Brazil is far from being finished. Serious difficulties and 
inconsistencies remain in the general regulatory framework. The regulatory agencies have to 
be strengthened and the sector specific rules have to be defined. 
With regard to the national regulatory agencies, the changes should follow five lines: 
-  more coordination among the different sectoral agencies; 
-  permanent concern with competition matters and coordination between 
regulatory authorities and competition authorities;  
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-  institutional building in order to assure that the regulatory bodies are 
insulated from political interference and are adequately staffed and present 
technical excellence; 
-  accountability on the part of the regulators and maximum transparency in 
their activities. 
The ideal scope to establish mechanisms aiming at these elements would be the 
creation of a general law of regulatory agencies. A project was sent to the Congress in April of 
2004 containing part of the concerns listed here. However, there is no deadline for approval 
and several changes would have to be made in order to assure agencies’ independence.  
With respect to the sectoral regulatory framework, it is necessary to create new 
institutional frameworks in specific sectors (as natural gas and sanitation), to modify rules in 
others (as in petroleum and electricity) and to readjust the current norms in dynamic branches 
as telecommunications. Many other changes would be necessary for sectors which have not 
been discussed in this paper such as transportation and ports. 
It is obvious that general macroeconomic conditions are also important to permit 
resumption of investment in infra-structure, especially the financing conditions and the 
evolution of the long term interest rate. However, the institutional and microeconomic 
conditions underlined in this study are equally important. Improvement of the Brazilian infra-
structure hinges upon the appropriate combination of both macro and micro ingredients. And 
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A AP PP PE EN ND DI IX X   I I    I IN ND DE EP PE EN ND DE EN NC CE E   I IN ND DI IC CA AT TO OR R 
 
The objective of this section is to describe the construction of an independence 
indicator which reflects the different characteristics of independent regulation mentioned in 
Section 3. In order to do that, we formulate a questionnaire (Chart 12) to different jurisdictions 
and regulators, contemplating the relevant topics to assess institutional independence.  
Chart 12: Questionnaire of independence of regulatory agencies  














 8.1 Public session? 
NO (0) 
         
 
YES (1)    8.2 Decisions and rationales published on the                  
Internet?  NO (0) 
        
YES (1) 
 8.3 Public consultation? 
NO (0) 
         
YES (1)   
 8.4 Public hearing? 
NO (0) 
        
YES (1) 
9. Quarantine after completion of term  
NO (0) 

























  10. How does the regulatory agency named in item 1 interact with 




   (a)  Antitrust exemption 
  
   (b) Competitive competences 
  
   (c) Complementary competences 
  
   (d) Antitrust regulation 
  
  (e) Other (specify)  
 
 
11. This questionnaire was answered by?   
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The first question concerns the appointment process. The criterion used was whether 
the appointment occurs with participation of the Legislative, or with the exclusive 
responsibility of the Executive Government. If Legislative participates, the agency receives 1 
point; if not, it receives zero.  
The second question assesses if there is minimal technical background in the relevant 
area required for the executive to occupy the office. If legislation does not require academic or 
professional experience, it is deemed that the agency has a low technical requirement, 
receiving a zero grade. Otherwise the agency receives one point. 
The third question attempts to measure the term of office of the main executives. The 
question was subdivided in to three parts. The first verifies whether the term of office is fixed. 
If positive, the agency receives one point. The second verifies the possibility of the executive 
having a second term of office. If negative, the agency receives one point. The third 
distinguishes between long and short term of office. In this case, long term of office (of four or 
more years) has preference over short ones (less than four years) in terms of independence, 
thus receiving one point. 
The fourth question assesses the budgetary autonomy of the regulatory agency. In this 
case it was established that 30% of the agency’s budget should come from own resources (fees 
and public services fees). For any percentage higher this minimum, the agency receives one 
point. 
The fifth question assesses whether or not the decisions are collective. If affirmative, 
the agency receives one point. 
The sixth question assesses whether appeal of agency’s decisions is restricted to the 
judiciary, excluding the possibilities of a hierarchical appeal to ministries or to other bodies of 
the administration. If affirmative, the agency will receive one point. 
The seventh question assesses the degree of transparency of the decisions of the 
regulatory agency. In this case four sub-questions are used. The first verifies whether or not the  
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decision sessions are public. The second verifies whether or not the decisions are published on 
the internet. The third, examines if there are public consultations. Lastly, the forth question 
verifies whether public hearings exist for important cases. For each positive answer the agency 
receives one point. The average of the sub-queries is computed as being the results for the 
transparency field. 
The purpose of the eighth question is to verify whether the regulator is submitted to a 
period of quarantine upon leaving the position in the agency. One point is ascribed if there is a 
period of quarantine. 
In order to capture the independence characteristics described previously, a second 
measuring criterion was used: value 1 is ascribed for each of the eight elements of 
independence. The lack of an institutional characteristic that favors independence will be 
captured by the value zero. For questions with more than one item (questions 3 and 7) the 
result represents the average of values for each item. Lastly, the partial points are added and II 
is obtained as shown in Equation 1. 







         (1) 
Where i represents each individual question, so that ai Є [0; 1] represents the score 
obtained; and 0 ≤ II ≤ 8. 
The closer the score is to eight, the higher the independence indicator is. Note that this 
indicator captures only formal independence. The extent to which the regulatory authority is 
independent in practice is not directly reflected in II.  
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A AP PP PE EN ND DI IX X   I II I    R RE EG GR RE ES SS SI IO ON N   R RE ES SU UL LT TS S   O OF F   T TH HE E   M MO OD DE EL L   
 
Chart 13: Model 01 Results 
Dependent Variable: LNII 
Included observations: 112 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
HDI 
1 β   -0.7817 0.4261  -1.83 0.069 
S_Electr 
2 β   0.3124 0.1588  1.97 0.052 
S_Telecom 
3 β   0.3636 0.1570  2.32 0.022 
S_Gás 
4 β   0.3000 0.1623  1.85 0.067 
F_Franc 
5 β   0.2401 0.1204  1.99 0.049 
Constant 
0 β   3.5412 0.3526 10.04 0.000 
R-squared  0.1057      F-statistic     2.51 
Adjusted R-squared  0.0636      Prob(F-statistic)   0.0346 




Chart 14: Model 02 Results 
Dependent Variable: LNII 
Included observations: 81 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
AGE 
1 β   -0.1533 0.3280  -0.47 0.642 
HDI 
2 β   -1.3543 0.7064  -1.92 0.059 
S_Electr 
3 β   0.2326 0.1995  1.17 0.247 
S_Telecom 
4 β   0.3184 0.2015  1.58 0.118 
S_Gás 
5 β   0.1980 0.1987  1.00 0.323 
F_Franc 
6 β   0.3913 0.1465  2.67 0.009  
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Constant 
0 β   4.1139 0.6269  6.56 0.000 
R-squared  0.1475      F-statistic  2.13 
Adjusted R-squared  0.0783      Prob(F-statistic)  0.0594 
Source: The authors 
 
 